Practical Information

1. Conference venue:
The conference will be held at the Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw.
The adress is:
Krakowskie Przedmieście 3
00-047 Warszawa
Here’s the google maps link for you:
The conference will be held in the rooms:
– 108 (Monday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday)
– 4 (Tuesday)
The room 108 is located on the 1st floor of the building – after entering the building take the stairs and go along the corridor.
The room 4 is on the ground floor – after entering the building just go along the corridor till its end.
There are both blackboards and the screens suitable for electronic presentations in both of the rooms, so it’s going to be quite easy.
The coffee breaks will be held in the Institute’s courtyard on the ground floor – the entrance to the courtyard is in the middle of the ground floor corridor (the same one that gets you to the room 4).
2. Conference dinners.
We will have (at least) two conference dinners and a couple of conference beers.
On Monday, September 5th, we are going to KOTŁOWNIA restaurant (“Boiler” in English) which is located in the smallest (and arguably the most beautiful) district of Warsaw, called Żoliborz (which comes from the Frnech “Jolie Bord”, that is – the beautiful shore).
The restaurant is located on Suzina 8 street, here you have the google map:
The restaurant has prepared a special menu for us.
On Thrusday, September 8th, we are going to Chmielarnia Marszałkowska restaurant which is actually a connection of a multitap bar and an Indian-Nepali-Thai restaurant:
For this one we will need a declaration, who’s coming, since the restaurant needs an advance for the reservation (50 PLN per person) and we need to know it before Tuesday evening.
For Tuesday, Wednesday and Friday, the conference events/parties will be surprises, but we will try to show you different parts of Warsaw.
We will go to the restaurants together – just after the last talks.
3. Lunch suggestions: https://www.google.com/maps/d/u/0/edit?mid=1ALGg37D7Aqgahx96VV61DHzieTw
4. Moving around Warsaw: Warsaw is well-communicated – you will need the tickets (valid on the underground, the trams, buses and city trains) – they are easy to buy. You can buy them in many shops, kiosks and on the bus/tram/underground stops – the ticket tariffs are here:
And a website that is better in giving hints on how to commute:

Jacek Wawer’s Invited Lecture: Branching Time and the Semantics of Future Contingents

Title: Branching Time and the Semantics of Future Contingents

Abstract:

In the series of talks, I weave together two threads present in the philosophy of Branching Time—semantics and metaphysics. I relate the semantic theories introduced in the setting to their underlying, metaphysical considerations. In the model of Branching Time, alternative paths of evolution of a system are represented by a treelike structure. I first investigate the metaphysical significance of the model. I pay special attention to the assumption of modal neutrality which has been widely accepted in the field. According to modal neutrality, all elements of the branching structure are equally real. In particular, no part of the structure can be absolutely distinguished as actual. I call the brand of theories that accept modal neutrality Branching Realism. I investigate how the assumption of modal neutrality influences the semantic treatment of future contingents, i.e., statements concerning possible, but not necessary, future events. I argue that realistic set-up is particularly hostile to futurism (i.e., the thesis that some future contingents are true). Against the background of Ockhamist semantics, I outline a number of alternatives available to Branching Realists; specifically: modalism, extremism, three-valued semantics, supervaluationism, and relativism (including assessment relativism, history relativism, and local relativism). Then, I investigate the semantic theories that combine branching with futurism. The Thin Red Line theory, as I understand it, took upon itself the unpromising task of introducing futurism into the Genuinely Realistic worldview. It generates a tension that can be, and has been, exploited to attack this theory on metaphysical and semantic grounds. I conclude that the only way to defend futurism in the context of branching is by rejecting modal neutrality. I call this view Branching Actualism. In Branching Actualism, we can conditionalize the truth value of sentences about the future on what will actually happen in the future. Then, bivalence of future contingents becomes a rather non-controversial idea. I argue that Branching Actualism avoids the the objections that threatened the Thin Red Line theory.

Zalan Gyenis’s Invited Lectures: General properties of Bayesian learning as statistical inference determined by conditional expectations I, II & How much can a Bayesian agent learn?

FIRST AND SECOND TALK:

TITLE: General properties of Bayesian learning as statistical inference determined by conditional expectations I, II

ABSTRACT: Step by step we build up a general framework for studying the general properties of general Bayesian learning, where “general Bayesian learning” means inferring a state from another that is regarded as evidence, and where the inference is conditionalizing the evidence using the conditional expectation determined by a reference probability measure representing the background subjective degrees of belief of a Bayesian Agent performing the inference. If every state is Bayes accessible from some other defined on the same set of random variables, then the set of states is called weakly Bayes connected. It is shown that the set of states is not weakly Bayes connected if the probability space is standard. The set of states is called weakly Bayes connectable if, given any state, the probability space can be extended in such a way that the given state becomes Bayes accessible from some other state in the extended space. It is shown that probability spaces are weakly Bayes connectable. Since conditioning using the theory of conditional expectations includes both Bayes’ rule and Jeffrey conditionalization as special cases, the results presented generalize substantially some results obtained earlier for Jeffrey conditionalization.

THIRD TALK:

TITLE: How much can a Bayesian agent learn?

ABSTRACT: The Bayes Blind Spot of a Bayesian Agent is the set of probability measures on a Boolean algebra that are absolutely continuous with respect to the background probability measure (prior) of a Bayesian Agent on the algebra and which the Bayesian Agent cannot learn by conditionalizing no matter what (possibly uncertain) evidence he has about the elements in the Boolean algebra. We investigate the size of the Blind Spot in the finite and infinite cases.

Laura Fontanella’s Invited Lecture: The Choice of New Axioms in Set Theory

Title: The Choice of New Axioms in Set Theory
The development of axiomatic set theory originated from the need for a rigorous investigation of the foundations of mathematics. The classical theory of sets ZFC offers a rich framework for mathematics, nevertheless many crucial problems cannot be solved within this theory. For this reason, set theorists have been exploring new principles that would allow one to answer some fundamental questions that are independent from ZFC. Research in this area has led to consider several candidates for a new axiomatisation such as Large Cardinal Axioms, Forcing Axioms, Projective Determinacy and others. The legitimacy of such new axioms is, however, heavily debated and gave rise to extensive discussions around an intriguing philosophical problem: what is an axiom in mathematics? What criteria would lead us to welcome or reject a new axiom for set theory? Self-evidence, intuitive appeal, fruitfulness are some of the many criteria that have been proposed. The future of set theory very much depends on how we answer such questions. The main objective of this tutorial is to illustrate the main candidates for new axioms in contemporary set theory and discuss the basic motivations and objections to their legitimacy. The tutorial will consist in 4 lectures:
– Lecture 1: we will briefly survey the evolution of the concept of axiom in mathematics and we will discuss to what extent the axiom of the theory ZFC can be supported by self-evidence, intuitive appeal or practical reasons
– Lecture 2: we discuss the axiom of constructibility and large cardinals axioms
– Lecture 3: we discuss Determinacy hypotheses
– Lecture 4: we discuss Forcing Axioms

Neil Barton’s Invited Lecture: Independence and Maximality in Set Theory

Title: Independence and Maximality in Set Theory

It is well-known that the standard axioms of set theory (ZFC) do not
suffice to settle many natural set-theoretic questions (and some
category-theoretic ones for that matter). One way that many set
theorists (including Godel and contemporary scholars) have sought to
resolve this independence is through the use of *maximality*
principles: argue that our set concept should engender the
structure(s) satisfying it with many and varied sets (in some
mathematically precise sense). This series of lectures aims to
introduce students to the phenomenon of set-theoretic independence and
explore principles aiming to capture maximality.

In Lecture 1 (Independence and Large Cardinals) we’ll explore the
techniques and philosophical issues surrounding two kinds of
independence: statements (such as *Projective Determinacy*) that are
*responsive* to the addition of large cardinal axioms (which we’ll
also examine), and statements *unresponsive* to the addition of large
cardinals (such as the *Continuum Hypothesis*). We’ll show how strong
large cardinal principles can be characterised through elementary
embeddings, and then make some remarks as to how far this can be
extended, looking at where and how they become inconsistent, and
making some philosophical observations.

In Lecture 2 (Reflection and Independence) we’ll examine one way the
existence of large cardinals has been motivated: through the use of
*reflection principles*, which aim to say (in some mathematically
precise sense) that a structure satisfying our concept of set should
be indistinguishable from one of its initial segments. We note a
challenge posed by Koellner: reflection principles seem either *weak*
or *inconsistent*. We’ll then explore two attempts to surmount
Koellner’s challenge: the addition of embeddings and the use of a
second-order satisfaction predicate.

In Lecture 3 (Absoluteness Principles) we’ll look at a third kind of
principle that has been said to capture the maximality of
set-theoretic structures, through asserting the absoluteness between
certain structures. In this regard we’ll look at two approaches:
forcing axioms and the Inner Model Hypothesis. Again we’ll see where
and how these kinds of principles go inconsistent, but what can be
accomplished with them. We’ll discuss a third problem in the
discussion of maximality: how to synthesise mutually inconsistent
principles. We’ll conclude that there’s lots of interesting
philosophical and mathematical work to be done in the area!

Updated Program of Entia et Nomina 2016

Monday, 5th September, room 108 (1st floor)

10:00 – 11:00 – Laura Fontanella – Invited Lecture 1 (The Choice of New Axioms in Set Theory I)
11:00 – 11:15 – discussion

11:15 – 11:35 – Coffee Break

11:35 – 12:15 – Zuzana Rybaříková – Logic and Ontology of A. N. Prior
12:15 – 12:25 – Commentary 1 (Valerie Lynn Therrien)
12:25 – 12:35 – Commentary 2 (Tomasz Zyglewicz)
12:35 – 12:45 – discussion

12:45 – 13:45 – Jacek Wawer – Invited Lecture 1 (Branching Time and the Semantics of Future Contingents I)
13:45 – 14:00 – discussion

14:00 – 15:30 – Lunch Break

15:30 – 16:30 – Zalan Gyenis – Invited Lecture 1 (General properties of Bayesian learning as statistical inference determined by conditional expectations I)
16:30 – 16:45 – discussion

16:45 – 17:15 – Coffee Break

17:15 – 17:55 – Tomasz Steifer – Optimal Predictors and what does it mean to better predict?
17:55 – 18:05 – Commentary 1 (Paulina Piękoś, Agnieszka Proszewska)
18:05 – 18:15 – Commentary 2 (Michał Tomasz Godziszewski)
18:15 – 18:25 – discussion

 

Tuesday, 6th September, room 4 (ground floor)

11:10 – 11:30 – Coffee Break

11:30 – 12:30 – Jacek Wawer – Invited Lecture 2 (Branching Time and the Semantics of Future Contingents II)
12:30 – 12:45 – discussion

12:45 – 13:45 – Zalan Gyenis – Invited Lecture 2 (General properties of Bayesian learning as statistical inference determined by conditional expectations II)
13:45 – 14:00 – discussion

14:00 – 15:30 – Lunch Break

15:30 – 16:30 – Laura Fontanella – Invited Lecture 2 (The Choice of New Axioms in Set Theory II)
16:30 – 16:45 – discussion

16:45 – 17:15 – Coffee Break

17:15 – 17:55 – Paulina Piękoś, Agnieszka Proszewska – The evolution of a concept of feasible computation and its theoretical and practical implications
17:55 – 18:05 – Commentary 1 (Dariusz Kalociński)
18:05 – 18:15 – Commentary 2 (Antonio Matamoros Ochman)
18:15 – 18:25 – discussion

 

Wednesday, 7th September, room 108

10:00 – 11:00 – Zalan Gyenis – Invited Lecture 3 (How much can a Bayesian agent learn?)
11:00 – 11:15 – discussion

11:15 – 11:35 – Coffee Break

11:35 – 12:35 – Neil Barton – Invited Lecture 1 (Independence and Maximality in Set Theory I)
12:35 – 12:50 – discussion

12:50 – 13:30 – Dariusz Kalociński – Effects of Game Length and Social Influence on Evolution of Semantics
13:30 – 13:40 – Commentary 1 (Jonathan Mai)
13:40 – 13:50 – Commentary 2 (Ewa Kalinowska, Adam Izdebski)
13:50 – 14:00 – discussion

14:00 – 15:30 – Lunch Break

15:30 – 16:30 – Laura Fontanella – Invited Lecture 3 (The Choice of New Axioms in Set Theory III)
16:30 – 16:45 – discussion

16:45 – 17:15 – Coffee Break

17:15 – 17:55 – Valerie Lynn Therrien – Wittgenstein and the Labirynth of “Actual Infinity”: The Critique of Transfinite Set Theory
17:55 – 18:05 – Commentary 1 (Marek Czarnecki)
18:05 – 18:15 – Commentary 2 (Maciej Bednarski)
18:15 – 18:25 – discussion

 

Thursday, 8th September, room 108

10:00 – 11:00 – Neil Barton – Invited Lecture 2 (Independence and Maximality in Set Theory II)
11:00 – 11:15 – discussion

11:15 – 11:35 – Coffee Break

11:35 – 12:15 – Juliusz Doboszewski – On epistemic holes in relativistic spacetimes
12:15 – 12:25 – Commentary 1 (Tomasz Steifer)
12:25 – 12:35 – Commentary 2 (Michał Tomasz Godziszewski)
12:35 – 12:45 – discussion

12:45 – 13:45 – Jacek Wawer – Invited Lecture 3 (Branching Time and the Semantics of Future Contingents III)
13:45 – 14:00 – discussion

14:00 – 15:30 – Lunch Break

15:30 – 16:30 – Laura Fontanella – Invited Lecture 4 (The Choice of New Axioms in Set Theory IV)
16:30 – 16:45 – discussion

16:45 – 17:15 – Coffee Break

17:15 – 17:55 – Bartosz Wcisło – Compositional truth and conservativity
17:55 – 18:05 – Commentary 1 (Juliusz Doboszewski)
18:05 – 18:15 – Commentary 2 (Rafał Urbaniak)
18:15 – 18:25 – discussion

 

Friday, 9th September, room 108

10:00 – 11:00 – Jacek Wawer – Invited Lecture 4 (Branching Time and the Semantics of Future Contingents IV)
11:00 – 11:15 – discussion

11:15 – 11:55 – Marek Czarnecki – Approximate truth for finite models and modal logic
11:55 – 12:05 – Commentary 1 (Bartosz Wcisło)
12:05 – 12:15 – Commentary 2 (Mateusz Łełyk)
12:15 – 12:30 – discussion

12:30 – 13:00 – Coffee Break

13:00 – 13:40 – Jonathan Mai – Resistant Rigidity
13:40 – 13:50 – Commentary 1 (Zuzana Rybaříková)
13:50 – 14:00 – Commentary 2 (Tadeusz Ciecierski)
14:00 – 14:10 – discussion

14:10 – 15:10 – Neil Barton – Invited Lecture 3 (Independence and Maximality in Set Theory III)
15:10 – 15:25 – discussion